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The Norwegian agri-food sector is under transformation, and as part of this the contrac-
tual relations between the various parts of the sector are rapidly changing. The purpose 
of this paper is to answer two questions: 
 How can these changes be explained?  
 What changes can be expected in the future? 
  
The analysis is based on insight from new institutional economics. The starting point is 
that the relations between agents depend on institutions and governance structure. 
Changes in one or both will influence the contractual relations. 
The paper focuses on relations between primary producers and first hand buyers of 
agricultural products. However, since changes at this part of the value chain is influ-
enced by what happens down-stream, we take developments in down-stream parts of the 
chains into account as far as we find it relevant.  
It is well known that agricultural policy and agricultural marketing cooperatives are 
important institutions for the Norwegian agri-food sector. Market regulation is an im-
portant part of the system. The cooperatives are assigned a crucial role as market regula-
tors. Therefore, we find it reasonable to start with a description and analysis of the im-
portance of agricultural policy and the cooperatives for contractual arrangements in the 
agri-food sector. 
For many years there was a tendency towards ³more state, less market´ in agriculture 
as well as in many other sectors. Since the 1980s, there has been an opposite tendency 
towards ³less state, more market´. This also applies to agriculture although Norway still 
is among the countries with highest support for agriculture, measures as percent PSE. 
However, because of the EEA agreement and the ongoing WTO negotiations, we expect 
reduced protection for Norwegian agriculture and less national support in the future. 
One way to meet some of the reduction requirements might be to change the target price 
system. Such a change would have implications for the market regulation system and 
the role of agricultural cooperatives. 
Traditionally, agricultural cooperatives bought relatively homogeneous products 
from their members and processed a variety of consumer goods. The membership was 
regulated through a relatively general membership contract, and pricing was based on 
well known grading and pricing systems. The cooperation between the cooperatives and 
the state ameliorated much of the risk that could otherwise have existed. It was no need 
for special contracts between the cooperative and the individual producers. Some of the 
products with increasing demand, is based on attributes originating at the farm level, for 
instance organic food. It is often difficult and costly to measure the attributes and to 
control that production is carried out in accordance with the principles creating the at-
tributes. In such cases, production contracts might be necessary to assure product qual-
ity. Thus, we expect that production contracts will become more frequent even in agri-
cultural cooperatives. 
The Norwegian retail sector is very concentrated with four chains having 99% of the 
market. This concentration developed from the 1980s through the 1990s, which is the 
period when the agricultural sector became less regulated. The market power shifted to 
some extent from processors to wholesalers and retailers. The retail chains have been in 
position to reap much of the benefits from the increased ³room´ for action and contract-
ing.  
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A lot of other changes are having an effect on the agri-food sector and the expected 
use of contracts. One factor is the consumer concerns over food safety. In order to as-
sure food safety, the various elements in the chain want control over production pro-
cesses at earlier stages of the production. Vertical integration or relational contracts 
might be the natural response from the involved actors.  
Traceability is another important part of quality assurance systems. The food indus-
tries in many countries have developed an enormous capacity to track the flow of food 
along the supply chain. Some systems track the food components back to the farm, 
while other track it only back to some key point in the production process. Firms have 
three primary objectives in developing, implementing and maintaining traceability sys-
tems; to improve supply management, to facilitate traceback for food safety and quality, 
and differentiate and market foods with subtle or undetectable quality attributes. Trace-
ability is not the only means to these objectives, and alone it cannot accomplish any of 
them. For instance, traceability systems do not create credence attributes, they simply 
verify their existence. Traceability systems will probably be combined with contracts in 
order to distribute risk. 
A system with few retail chains and relatively centralised procurement, leaves little 
room for local and small producers. Those who do not obtain contracts with any chain, 
might try to find other marketing channels. Farmers markets, farm shops, and other 
forms of direct marketing are examples of such marketing channels. The Farmers mar-
kets are examples of horizontal cooperation between producers. 
Globalisation of food trade (lower tariffs etc.) changes the relation between Norwe-
gian producers, processors, and retailers. The producers and processors will face 
tougher competition from foreign producers if and when the tariffs are reduced. If the 
retailers (the retail chains) are not satisfied with the delivery conditions offered by Nor-
wegian producers, the retailers could more and more easily substitute them with foreign 
producers. One response from Norwegian producers might be to use labelling as a 
means to secure markets, for instance the protected labels of origin. If the consumers are 
willing to pay a higher price for Norwegian products, this might be a successful strat-
egy. 
Finally, public standards and control schemes for organic farming and organic prod-
ucts mean that processors etc. can rely on these schemes and need not enter production 
contracts However, because of logistics and transaction costs the processing industry 
might offer contract only to producers in certain geographic areas. TINE, the national 
dairy cooperative, has such contracts. 
In conclusion, we expect government regulations of Norwegian agriculture to be impor-
tant for many years to come. But the agri-food sector will become more consumer- 
driven than it has been until now. Sales and production contracts will become more 
common in Norwegian agriculture in the future. Contracts will be more common for 
value-added products than for ³bulk´ products. Such contracts will develop also within 
some of the agricultural cooperatives.  
 3
 
The main purpose of the project ³Market coordination through new contractual ar-
rangements´ is to answer the following question:1 
What kind of new contractual arrangements between producers and buyers of 
agricultural products can be expected in periods with changing market struc-
ture, government involvement and consumer demand? 
 
The starting point for this project is that we observe changes in contractual arrange-
ments between agriculture and the buyers of agricultural products. For instance, while it 
some years ago was a large number of wholesalers selling fruit and vegetables to retail-
ers, the retail sector is now served with fruit and vegetables by three wholesalers, and 
approximately 75% of Norwegian fruit and vegetables are sold through these wholesal-
ers (Svennerud, 2004). Producers without contract with one of these wholesalers seem 
to have increasing difficulties in finding market outlets for their produce. Another ex-
ample is that the state¶s obligation to buy all Norwegian grain was terminated in 2001, 
and marketing contracts between cereal producers and grain elevators are emerging. 
Moreover, we observe new contractual arrangements in the farmers¶ marketing coopera-
tives for meat. How can these changes be explained? What changes can be expected in 
the future? 
The purpose of this working paper is to identify forces driving the changes in con-
tractual arrangements in the Norwegian agri-food sector. It is supposed that changes in 
the driving forces leads to changes in the contractual arrangements. Therefore, when we 
have identified the forces and ongoing changes in that forces, we are better able to in-
terpret what we observe in the sector and to predict what can be expected in the future.  
It is implicit in the question mentioned at the start of this chapter that market struc-
ture, government involvement, and consumer demand have an influence on contractual 
arrangements in the agri-food sector. But that is not necessary a complete list of impor-
tant factors. According to Young and Hobbs (2002: 429) changing consumer prefer-
ences, biotechnology, information technology, environmental pressure, credit and risk 
                                                 
 1 The Research Council of Norway, Project No. 147443/110 
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issues, as well as the reduction in global trade barriers are some of the driving forces 
behind contractual changes in general, and vertical coordination in particular.  
Our point of departure is that the need for contracts, as well as the more specific con-
tract design, is determined by characteristics within each part of the supply chain and in 
the institutional environment of the supply chains. Changes within the supply chains 
and in their environment lead to changes in the contractual arrangements.  
The project follows the path suggested by new institutional economics (NIE). Con-
tract theory is a part of NIE. We do not find it necessary to give a broad and complete 
presentation of NIE and contract theory in this working paper.2 Here we present only 
some elements that are basic to our analysis, and that we use frequently in the paper. 
NIE is an alternative to neo-classical economic theory which is otherwise the dominant 
economic theory. NIE is not as well structured as neo-classical economics, but ³there is 
close to unanimity within the NIE on the idea of limited cognitive competence±often 
referred to as bounded rationality´ (Williamson, 2000: 600). According to Williamson 
(2000), economic phenomena should be studied at several levels. He discusses four lev-
els, but we are mainly concerned with two of them: (a) the institutional environment, 
and (b) institutions of governance. The institutional environment includes both the for-
mal rules of the game (laws, polity, judiciary) and the informal rules of the game (cus-
toms, mores, norms). 
The institutions of governance are also referred to as the play of the game, and in-
clude markets, firms and bureaus. Governance structure fall into three broad groups; 
market, hierarchy and hybrid forms. Market is close to the perfectly competitive econ-
omy of textbooks in economics. In that case, independent firms produce goods and ser-
vices and sell them to other firms or to consumers. Hierarchy, or internal governance 
structure, is found when all decisions are taken within a firm. There is no open trading 
of goods. Hybrid governance is somewhere between market and hierarchy, and there are 
many forms of such governance. Verhaegen & Van Huylenbroeck (2002) classify the 
hybrid forms in three; framework, co-ordinating, and participating governance with 
framework closest to markets and participating closest to hierarchy. The contractual 
forms typically vary with institutional framework and governance structure. 
Farmers and marketing organisations/processors are contracting for several reasons 
which can be summarised in a few (partly overlapping) key words; e.g. to increase or 
secure profitability, to reduce risk, reduce transaction costs, to assure demand or supply, 
to assure quality, to circumvent asset specificity, to get access to technology, and to get 
access to capital, (see for instance Hudson, 2000; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). The ³need´ 
for and use of contracts can thus be expected to depend on many factors. In the rest of 
the paper we try to discuss this within the framework of the Norwegian agri-food sector 
with special emphasis on the relation between the farmers and the next buyers of agri-
cultural products.  
The remaining of this paper is divided into three parts. First, we discuss the impor-
tance of agricultural policy and the agricultural marketing cooperatives from a contrac-
tual point of view (chapter 2). We underline that these two institutions in combination 
have secured an outlet for agricultural products and reduced much of the risk associated 
with fluctuating prices and markets. We also see clear indications of changes in policy. 
We expect that the room for contracting will increase, and that we will be observing a 
wider spectre of contractual formats in the next years. Chapter 3 includes a discussion 
of factors that we believe will be important when the increased room for contracting is 
to be filled. Some tentative conclusions are drawn in chapter 4.  
                                                 
 2 New institutional economics and contract theory have been described by many authors, e.g. 
Williamson (2000, 2002); Brousseau & Glanchant (2002). We have elsewhere (Borgen & 
Hegrenes, 2005) given a more detailed, but still short, introduction to NIE and contract the-
ory and discussed the relevance of these theories for analyses of the agri-food sector. 
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It is commonly held by observers that the state and the agricultural cooperatives regu-
late so much of the activities within the Norwegian agricultural sector that there is al-
most nothing left to contract for. Without going into details on this statement, it is evi-
dently true that the agricultural policy and the farmers¶ cooperatives form important 
parts of the institutional environment for agricultural producers. Our point of departure 
here is that changes in agricultural policy and the role of cooperatives have a significant 
influence on the current and future design of agricultural contracts. A short review of 
the Norwegian agricultural policy and the role of agricultural marketing cooperatives is 
therefore a reasonable starting point for a discussion of forces leading to changes in con-
tracts in the agri-food sector. We focus on the parts of the policy and role of coopera-
tives that seem to be most relevant for the discussion and do not intend to give a com-
plete picture. Since many of the regulations are rooted in decisions in the 1930s (see for 
instance Espeli, 2002), we start our brief historical review at that point of time.  
 
Around the 1930s, Norwegian agriculture, like agriculture in many other western coun-
tries, experienced falling product prices and increasingly unstable markets. In order to 
ameliorate the situation for farmers and the nation, the Norwegian government and the 
parliament (Stortinget) introduced a variety of measures. The greater part of these 
measures can be classified as market intervention instruments to increase demand and to 
stabilize and increase agricultural product prices. From 1929, the government entered a 
legal obligation to buy all grain produced in Norway. In 1930, the Norwegian parlia-
ment decided to introduce a regime of quantitative import restriction. Also in 1930, a 
public organisation, the Marketing Board (Omsetningsrndet), was established to imple-
ment and administer market regulations, and levies were introduced to finance market 
schemes. The farmers¶ cooperatives were by law given a vital role in implementing the 
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various schemes. Their obligation was to actively contribute to the implementation of 
the national agricultural policy (Almns, 2004).3  
After World War Two, the Norwegian state undertook an even greater responsibility 
for securing all groups in the nation a decent income and standard of living (Steen, 
1988). The Norwegian government and the farmers unions negotiated on prices and 
other support measures. This policy was formalized in the Basic Agricultural Agree-
ment (Hovedavtalen for jordbruket) from 1950 (revised in 1992). The existence of mar-
ket regulation schemes was a precondition for many of the price schemes. This system 
was developed further in the 1950s, especially in 1958 when the government and the 
farmers unions agreed on target prices for several products, and the farmers coopera-
tives undertook the task of operating the market in such a way that the agreed prices 
could be obtained from the market.4 This corporatist approach to market regulation was 
conceived of as an innovative way of organizing a sector that is characterized by a sub-
stantial level of uncertainty. 
In 1965, the Parliament formulated an income goal for agriculture. The income gen-
erated by a modern and rationally-managed farm that employed one annual worker had 
to be at least at the same level as the average wage income in the manufacturing indus-
try. In 1975, the Parliament decided on a timetable for attaining this income goal; i.e. 
the target of parity was set by 1982. The implementation of this decision led to in-
creased supply of many products while the demand grew more slowly, especially after 
the partly removal and reduction of consumer price subsidies in 1982. The answer was 
(partly) to introduce more regulation. For instance, a milk quota system (the ³two-price´ 
system) was introduced in 1983. Measures were introduced in order to balance other 
markets too, for instance the market for meat. Until the early 1980s, the potato market 
was relatively unregulated. However, the Potato Marketing Board was established in 
1982 and quality payments were introduced in order to improve potato quality and to 
effectively regulate the domestic potato market. 
In summary, in this period agriculture and the marketing of agricultural produce were 
more and more regulated in a relatively close cooperation between the state, the farmers 
unions, and the farmers marketing cooperatives. Hence, tasks and activities that other-
wise could have been regulated by various types of contracts, were instead regulated in 
a cooperation between these organisations.  
 
The 1980s witnessed the beginning of an overall political trend to remove regulations in 
many branches of the Norwegian economy. Some state-owned monopolies were priva-
tised into public limited companies (aksjeselskaper) competing on freer markets, for 
instance in broadcasting (radio and television), telephone and telegraph, credit markets 
and later on the electricity market. The development in Norway was in tune with a more 
general trend in many western countries. A main reason for this development was the 
perceived weaknesses associated with the central planning and regulatory policy that 
were implemented after the 2nd World War. These weaknesses were partly due to the 
tension between plan (state) and market; when the tension becomes too big, it becomes 
                                                 
 3 See e.g. Norby & Aresvik (1951) and Beal & Nesheim (1966) for a description of the early 
history of cooperative milk marketing in Norway. Espeli (2002) gives a review of the history 
of regulations of Norwegian agriculture, mainly since 1970, but with references to the period 
1930±1970. Tennbakk (2004) gives a brief description of the present regulatory system. 
 4 This refers mainly to meat. The agreement is printed several places, e.g. Bonden (1973). 
Kaldahl (1994) gives an evaluation of the agreement, both as it was perceived in 1958 and at 
the time of writing in the 1990s. 
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too profitable to use resources to evade the regulations (Hagen, 1997: 1). A part of this 
phenomenon goes under the name ³regulatory capture´ in the scholarly literature (see 
e.g. Levine, 1998).  
The Norwegian state was never so directly involved in production activities in agri-
culture as in some other sectors of the economy, for example telephone and telegraph 
and some manufacturing industries. However, as seen in section 2.1, the state had a sub-
stantial influence on the agricultural sector through a set of financial and legal regula-
tions. Around 1990 critical observers claimed that the benefits of the agricultural policy 
were not large enough to justify the costs (see for instance NOU 1988: 21, especially 
chapter 7.5; OECD, 1990; Brunstad, Gaasland & Vnrdal, 1995). The overall rationality 
of the policy was questioned. At that time it was quite clear that the GATT negotiations 
would have an influence on agricultural policy, and a Norwegian membership in the EU 
was launched as a realistic option. In 1992, the government published St.prp. nr. 8 
(1992±93) and clearly signalled that policy changes had to be implemented. Since then, 
the income level for Norwegian farmers has been conceived of as a means to reach 
other political goals, more than a goal in itself. These other goals concern domains such 
as protection of the environment, viable rural areas, food safety and food security. As 
seen through the lenses of the principal agent framework,5 this implies that the govern-
ment (the principal), has some objectives it wants to realize, and tries to incite farmers 
(the agents), to act in a way that contribute to fulfil the objectives. The government and 
the farmers do not write formal contracts to achieve the goals, but the government uses 
financial support to both relatively general support measures and measures aimed at 
specific tasks in order to get the incentives right. The costs of implementing, adminis-
trating and controlling the working of the political measures represent transaction costs. 
As emphasised by e.g. Vatn (2002), it is potentially a conflict between targeting and 
transaction costs. In Norway, many subsidy measures are relatively broad-spectred in 
the sense that the farmers do not have to comply with a set of very specific rules in or-
der to be eligible receivers of the subsidies.  
The GATT/WTO agreement of 1993 implied a change from quantitative import re-
striction to a system based on import tariffs combined with rules for market access and 
restriction on subsidised export. The government (and parliament) decided to abandon 
the state monopoly on import of grains and replaced it with an import tariff system, but 
the state still had the obligation to buy all Norwegian grain.  
However, the binding import tariffs were so high that for most products Norwegian 
agriculture still had an effective border protection. The national target prices were in 
most cases lower than world market prices plus binding import tariffs.6 For some prod-
ucts, for instance cereals, Norway used actual tariffs lower than the binding tariffs, but 
still the tariffs gave a protection for Norwegian cereals.  
The Potato Marketing Board was closed down in 1998, and some of the subsidy 
schemes were terminated while others were increased to compensate the producers for 
the income loss. The main reason for this change in policy was that it should be left for 
the market to demand and pay for quality. The subsidy schemes had been targeted to-
wards the producers, and the quality was normally high when potatoes were sold from 
the potato producers. Yet the quality of potatoes sold to consumers had not improved, in 
fact it had decreased, according to the Ministry of Agriculture (St.prp. nr. 67 (1997±
1998). Approximately 60% of the damages to potatoes occurred beyond the farm-gate. 
                                                 
 5 ³Principal Agent Theory is concerned with situations in which one party, namely the prin-
cipal requires a second party, namely the agent, to undertake an action on the principal¶s be-
half.´ (Hornibrook & Fearne, 2001).  
 6 It is no import tariff on wool and fur from fur bearing animals (mink and foxes). There are 
import tariffs for part of the year for fruit and vegetables. It is free import of some products 
from less developed countries. 
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The quality subsidy scheme, therefore, had only had minor effects on the quality of po-
tatoes sold to consumers. 
In 1999, the government produced a white paper on agricultural policy (St.meld. nr. 
19 (1999±2000)). According to this white paper, the focus of the agricultural policy 
should be shifted from producer interests to consumer interests. Increased efforts to se-
cure food safety were an important part of these changes. Control measures to secure 
food safety were extended or introduced, partly as a response to ³food scandals´, such 
as the BSE scandal in UK and other countries.  
The production of food was still considered to be a major task for agriculture, but ag-
riculture should also produce public goods such as attractive landscapes, viable rural 
areas, food security etc. Organic farming was emphasized and stimulated, partly as an 
environmental friendly way of producing and partly as a means of increasing food di-
versity.  
The government¶s obligation to buy grain was terminated in 2001, and a system of 
target prices was introduced for cereals. The relatively low import tariffs (compared 
with the binding tariffs) were replaced by a system of binding tariffs and import quotas 
at a lower tariff. The market regulation scheme for grains is now quite similar to the 
schemes for milk and meat. Several reasons can explain the change in 2001, for instance 
that the system existing in the late 1990s was evaluated to be too expensive, increasing 
regional price differences for concentrates were observed, and a perceived possibility of 
surplus supply of grains caused by too much import. (See Forsell & Hegrenes (2000) for 
a summary of the discussion leading to the changes in cereal marketing order in 2001). 
The fundamental role of farmers¶ cooperatives came gradually under public scrutiny. 
The regulatory model applied in Norwegian agricultural markets exhibits a basic para-
dox: On the one hand, the large marketing cooperatives are assigned a crucial role as 
market regulator, and on the other hand, competition is encouraged even though compe-
tition weakens the coordinating power of the cooperatives (Tennbakk, 2004). For in-
stance, in the milk sector, where the cooperatives had benefited from a 100 per cent 
share of milk deliveries (at first hand), the government encouraged competition from 
other domestic dairy companies. The authorities faced the challenge of how to design a 
regulatory framework that secured equal terms for all competitors. A new market regu-
lation scheme for milk was implemented as of January 1, 2004 after several changes 
during the period 1997±2004 (see e.g. Bergset et al. (2004) for a description of the regu-
lation system since 1930).  
The general trend since the 1990s has been to deregulate agricultural markets. How-
ever, more and more regulation is implemented to take care of food safety and other 
consumer concerns. As member of the WTO, Norway is obliged to adapt the domestic 
support to agriculture to the agreed WTO regulations. Norway has a relatively high 
support for agriculture, measured as percentage PSE (Producer Subsidy Estimate) 
(OECD, 2004). Norway is one of six WTO member states that continue to use the ³Blue 
Box´ (Hart & Beghin, 2004: 20), and Norway has notified a relatively large part of her 
agricultural support as ³Blue Box´ support. The WTO (2004) framework agreement 
from 2004 says that the ³Blue Box´ support should not exceed 5% of the production 
value, but with possibilities for special treatment, to be negotiated on, for member states 
with a large share of such support. Anyhow, there is a pressure on import tariffs and 
domestic support, and the ongoing WTO negotiations can be expected to result in fur-
ther reduction in trade restrictions. The national target price system might be challenged 
also. Already there is increasing competition from imports, not least for processed food, 
partly because of the trade agreement between Norway and the EU (Kjuus, 2004).  
In conclusion, it seems clear that the Norwegian government tries to stimulate com-
petition in the food sector. More focus is set on consumer concerns. The nature of the 
market regulation is changing. An important objective of the present regulation is to 
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secure competition on equal terms between marketing cooperatives and other firms. 
New regulatory measures are introduced in order to secure food safety. Subsequently, 
the role of the marketing cooperatives is subject to change, as will be explored further in 
the next section.  
 
Several authors have emphasised that the function of agricultural cooperatives is to pro-
tect farmers¶ interests from being jeopardized by external integrators (Nesheim, 1964). 
The (British) Committee of Inquiry on Contract Farming (1972: 67) found that ³(t)he 
impression from visits to Europe and America is that nowhere is contract farming prac-
tised more than in the UK (perhaps because where agricultural co-operation is more 
extensive there is less need for ad hoc contracting.´ As the Norwegian agricultural co-
operatives have more tasks and serve more purposes than agricultural cooperatives in 
other countries, we will take a closer look at the role of the Norwegian agricultural co-
operatives from the perspective of contracting. 
 
Since the 1930s, farmers¶ marketing cooperatives have had important roles in imple-
menting agricultural policies. The role as market regulator was clearly defined in the 
1950s. The government and the farmers unions negotiate annually on target prices for 
many agricultural products (the Agricultural Agreement). It is the responsibility of the 
farmers¶ sales cooperatives to balance the market to make it possible to obtain the target 
price, but not a higher price. If the production is too high and presses the prices below 
the target price, the cooperatives implement measures to handle the ³surplus´. Export 
was earlier a usual way of disposing of surpluses, but this possibility is reduced accord-
ing to the WTO agreement, and might be reduced further. The market regulation is fi-
nanced by a levy on agricultural products. A semi-public board (Omsetningsrndet) ad-
ministers the funds. 
The market regulators have three specific obligations (Landbruksdepartementet, 
2003): 
 Provide information; i.e. all actors have a right to obtain full information on all ac-
tivities that the market regulator conduct as market regulator  
 A duty to buy the produce  
 A duty to treat all actors on equal terms concerning supply of raw materials and at 
equal prices. 
 
The market regulators have an obligation not only to buy what their members want to 
sell, but also produce from others, in accordance with the specific regulations for each 
product. The market regulation is most extensive for cereals, milk, meat, and poultry 
(egg and chickens). The system is much less developed in the case of fruit and vegeta-
bles.7 The cooperative sale organisation in horticulture is since 1998 a producer organi-
sation attached to one wholesaler (Bama). This organisation has not been delegated any 
role in market regulation. But there are still target prices for potatoes, apples, and some 
vegetables for part of the year. 
                                                 
 7 The Market Act lists the products which are included in the market regulation system: meat 
of cattle, calf, mutton and lamb, reindeer and poultry, pork, cereals and oil seeds, milk, but-
ter, eggs, fur, reindeer hides, and products from horticulture and green house products. The 
by-law (forskrift) on the authority of The Marketing Board (Omsetningsrndet) explicitly 
mentions cereals, meat, eggs and poultry, and milk. (Landbruksdepartementet, 2003).  
 10 
In order to carry out their tasks as market regulators, it is an advantage (and probably 
a necessary condition) for the cooperatives to have a high market share at the first hand 
market. The cooperatives in milk and meat have market shares of more than 75 per cent. 
On the other hand, Felleskj¡pet, which is the market regulator for cereals, has a market 
share of approximately 50 per cent as a buyer of cereals (Table 2.1).  
To some extent the Norwegian cooperatives are delegated functions that in other 
countries is handled by public or semi-public institutions, like marketing boards. In 
Norway, there has been a close cooperation between the government and the farmers¶ 
organisations. There has also been a close cooperation between the state and business 
and labour federations in general. The notion ³corporatist state´ has been used to de-
scribe the situation.8 
The combination of governance and cooperative regulation has secured that all do-
mestic producers have had the possibility to sell their produce at the prevailing condi-
tions, and secured equal treatment of all actors. Risk and transaction costs have thereby 
been reduced for all involved parties. 
Organisation First hand  
(raw material) 
Processed 
food1) 
TINE BA, Norwegian Dairies 98  
      Milk  95 
      Butter  100 
      Yoghurt  84 
      Cheese (brown)  93 
      Cheese (white)  78 
      Processed cheese (Smelteost)  18 
Gilde Norsk Kj¡tt BA, (Norwegian Meat Cooperative) 75 532) 
Prior Norway    
      Eggs 67 663) 
      Poultry meat 81 823) 
The Norwegian Fur Breeders¶ Association 100  
Hoff Norwegian Potato Processing Industries 35 38 
The Norwegian Honey Association 59 92 
Gartnerhallen (Sales Organization for Horticultural 
Producers) 
61 66 
The Norwegian Agricultural Purchasing and Market-
ing Cooperatives (Felleskj¡pet) 
      Cereals (bought) 
 
 
53 
 
      Concentrates (sold)  70 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 8 Dryzek et al. (2003: 8) describe Norway as an example of a corporatist society. They define 
corporatism in terms of a tripartite concertation under which policy is made by agreement 
between the executive branch of government and peak business and labour federations. 
Business and labour federations agree to discipline their members in return for privileged ac-
cess to policy making.  
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This advanced planning system is now challenged for many reasons. The import protec-
tion has been reduced, especially for potatoes, fruit and other vegetables. The system is 
likely to be reduced further as a consequence of the ongoing WTO negotiations. In or-
der to adapt to possible future restrictions on the WTO ³amber box´, cf. the WTO 
framework for modalities from 1 August 2004 (WTO, 2004), a change or even removal 
of the target price scheme might be an option. The effects of such changes will probably 
depend on, inter alia, the reductions in import tariffs. 
 
If the agricultural-policy related tasks become less important or are removed from the 
cooperatives, they would still have the functions of ³pure´ marketing cooperatives and 
processors. Membership of a farmers¶ sales cooperative might be regarded as a kind of 
long term marketing contract. As long as a producer is member of the cooperative, (s)he 
has the right and the obligation to sell the products to the cooperative,9 and the coopera-
tive has an obligation to buy the products. The payment is based on classification sys-
tems10 and price systems that are known in advance.  
As already mentioned, many cooperatives have a high market share, see Table 2.1. 
Especially in the dairy sector, the government has encouraged the establishment of dairy 
plants independent of the cooperative dairies. This has been regarded as an element to 
increase competition in the sector and to increase the product spectre. The new dairy 
plants have to buy milk from the farmers¶ cooperatives or to have deliveries from their 
³own´ milk producers. In any case there might be a need for contracts to protect the 
large investments involved.  
To get a more complete picture of the driving forces behind new contractual relations 
in Norwegian agriculture, focus should also be set on the changing distribution of power 
between all players in the value chains of agri-foods in Norway. This analysis is de-
ferred to section 3.4, where particular emphasis is set on the role that the retailer chains 
now play as ³chain captains´. 
 
 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, contract farming and vertical integration were under de-
bate in Norwegian agriculture (e.g. Aresvik, 1955; Nesheim, 1960, 1962, 1964; Land-
brukets Sentralforbund & Norges Bondelag, 1962). At that time, there were some ex-
amples of contract farming in the vegetable sector and in the meat production (Land-
brukets Sentralforbund & Norges Bondelag, 1962). The slaughterhouse provided ani-
mals and credit, and the producer agreed to sell the animals to the slaughterhouse. There 
seem to have been two main reasons for the cooperative slaughterhouses to enter into 
contracting at that time: (1) competition from other slaughterhouses that had introduced 
contracting, and (2) the cooperatives were able to and wanted to provide credit to farm-
ers (Landbrukets Sentralforbund & Norges Bondelag, 1962:31). 
With a few exceptions11, however, contract farming did not evolve as an important 
governance mode within the Norwegian agriculture (see chapter 4 for a short descrip-
                                                 
 9 The statutes of Gilde Norsk Kj¡ttsamvirke BA (The Norwegian Meat Cooperative)  7 
states among others that ´Medlemmene har rett og plikt til n levere hele sin produksjon av 
slaktedyr til laget eller den mottaker det bestemmer. Unntatt fra dette er slakt til eget forbruk, 
til knrfolk og ansatte pn gnrden. 
 Medlemmet kan ikke selge varer i konkurranse med laget, men styret kan gi dispensasjon 
etter regler fastsatt av nrsm¡tet.´ 
 10 For meat the EUROP system is applied. This is an EU/EEA system. 
 11 Production of seed, vegetables for the cannery industries etc. 
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tion of the present situation). This situation is probably due to the combination of gov-
ernmental regulations and strong agricultural cooperatives with the authority to regulate 
markets. Another possible explanation is the introduction of a bank overdraft system in 
1968. The system is a co-operation between the banks and the agricultural cooperatives 
(and some other companies) and gives farmers access to credit. 
Nonetheless, since membership in a marketing cooperative might be regarded as a 
long-term marketing contract, contracts have been an important part of Norwegian agri-
culture for a long time. However, such constitutionally oriented contracts do not specify 
production quantities and prices which are usually integral parts of contracts.12  
 
Traditional agricultural cooperatives have been oriented towards handling relatively 
uniform raw materials that were transformed into a variety of products. The number of 
products has increased over time. Lately, the demand is even more differentiated, and 
some of the product qualities originate at the farm level (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2004). It is 
often difficult or costly to measure the differences objectively. This is a situation that 
calls for production contracting or other coordination mechanisms (see for instance 
Hennessy (1996)). S¡rensen (2005) has developed the classification system further, see 
Figure 2.1, also taking into account the significance of ³vertical´ differentiation which 
here refers to increasing degree of value-added production at the cooperative plants. A 
traditional cooperative is characterized by low differentiation of inputs and low differ-
entiation of outputs; i.e. a relatively limited number of products. A second type of coop-
eratives (value-added cooperatives) has a higher degree of processing. Higher differen-
tiation of inputs means that the cooperative moves towards a specialised traditional co-
operative or a specialised value-added cooperative. The specialised cooperatives have a 
high degree of differentiation of raw commodities. They might have one standard raw 
commodity and one or more specialised commodities. Standard pigs and specialty pigs 
are one example. Bogetoft & Olesen (2004: 120±122) discuss how to construct a pay-
ment system in order to exploit synergies between producers of standard pigs and spe-
cialty pigs. The criterion they suggest is ³that no coalitions of producers should obtain a 
profit smaller than the coalition¶s stand-alone profit, i.e. the amount of profit which the 
coalition can obtain outside the cooperative.´  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 12 Members of marketing cooperatives usually have an obligation to sell all their marketed 
produce to the cooperative, but the members are free to produce what they want.  
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Figure 2.1 Classification of cooperatives according to differentiation of inputs and out-
puts  
 
For decades, Norwegian agricultural policy has been characterised by numerous ambi-
tious goals. At institutional level, a range of measures, including market regulation, 
have been implemented to achieve the goals. An advanced corporatist model for regu-
lating domestic food markets has been developed. This model has served as a solution 
to key economic questions; determination of prices, regulation of aggregate production 
quantities, and handling of produced quantities. Strong regulation of imports has been a 
fundamental part of the policy. 
The majority of the agricultural producers are members of marketing cooperatives. 
These cooperatives have a duty to buy what the members produce. In addition they have 
important tasks in implementing the agricultural policy and market regulations in order 
to obtain the target prices. All producers have had an almost unconditional right to de-
liver their products at the time they prefer.  
In this context there has been relatively few issues left over for contracting as it is 
found in for instance the US agriculture. However, contracts have been applied in some 
parts of agriculture, for instance in the fruit and vegetable sector where the public in-
volvement is less than in many other sectors.  
However, the agricultural policy and the role of cooperatives have been changing re-
cently and might be changed even more in the future. The room for contracting is in-
creasing. Although agricultural policy and agricultural marketing cooperatives are im-
portant parts of the institutional environment for farmers, they are far from the only  
important factors. In the next chapter we shall look at other factors that have an influ-
ence on the agri-food sector. Our assumption is that these factors will to a large extent 
determine how the enhanced scope for contracting will be filled. 
I
II IV
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Traditional 
cooperative
Value-added 
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Specialised 
Value-added 
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Specialised 
Traditional 
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Low
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Processing of 
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In Chapter 2, we have briefly outlined some core characteristics of the Norwegian agri-
food sector that have had wide ramifications for the type of contracts in this sector. The 
market regulation model is withering, and the cooperatives are adapting to new and 
more demanding competitive conditions. The inevitable consequence is that many new 
sources of uncertainty are becoming increasingly more significant. The involved actors 
are exposed to increased uncertainty in many new ways and forms.  
As formulated in the vocabulary suggested by Transaction Cost Economics, the 
transactional nature of agri-food production and distribution is subject to increased 
complexity. The major drivers of transaction costs²asset specificity and transactional 
uncertainty²can easily be identified. Consequently, the straightforward prediction as 
seen through the lenses of Transaction Cost Economics is that the governance form will 
become more complex too. The nutshell version of this theory is that ³simple transac-
tions are governed by simple organizational structures, whereas complex transactions 
are governed by complex structures´. From this simplified basis, it is natural to predict 
that more complex contractual formats will unfold in the Norwegian agri-food sector the 
next decades. But this is nothing but a starting point. The more specific task at hand is 
to clarify the nature of the ongoing (and future) transformations in the sector, to sub-
stantiate them, to qualify their consequences for novel contractual arrangements, and to 
clarify how various players are influenced. Attention is paid to the new rules of the 
game (read: changes at the institutional level; macro) as well as to the strategic play and 
interplay between the involved actors (read: changes at the governance level; micro). To 
the largest possible extent, the changes will be interpreted from the perspective of the 
Transaction Cost Economics (see Borgen & Hegrenes (2005) for a more detailed review 
of this perspective).  
Our ambition is to contribute to clarify the most relevant questions rather than claim 
definitive conclusions with respect to the future contractual situation of the Norwegian 
agri-food sector. We start our exposition with a brief discussion of new consumer trends 
and new technology, both of which are interpreted as very broad driving forces.  
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It is well documented that new consumer trends play a decisive role in the current trans-
formation of the agri-food sector. In their study of innovation processes in the EU-
countries, Traill & Grunert (1997: 38) have shown that there are multiple innovation 
drivers at the consumer level, such as:  
  Consumer concerns; such as environmental consciousness and food safety. 
 Demographic factors; such as increased share of women in the paid labour force, 
which has contributed to the increased demand for convenience products. The de-
mand for more processed foodstuffs has increased rapidly as well.  
 Easy availability of food products, which implies that the same food are available 
throughout the entire Europe. This situation imposes new pressure on local food 
manufacturers who were previously more protected from competition.  
 The increasing significance and wider distribution of processed food. New product 
introductions have made available a huge range of processed foods, for instance 
ready-prepared chilled, frozen, canned, dried or ambient meals, based on many dif-
ferent ethnic and traditional cuisines. Another example is the wider range of func-
tional foods designed to promote positive health, such as ³live´ yoghurts, sports 
drinks, high-fibre foods and vitamin-enriched foods. To some extent, functional 
foods blur the distinctions between foods and pharmaceuticals. A last category of ex-
amples is all manner of sauces, fresh and frozen desserts, snacks (sweet and sa-
voury), ³mood´ foods, ³impulse´ foods, regional specialities etc.  
 
These ³new´ foods are variously packed in all shapes and sizes of containers which are 
increasingly recyclable or produced from recycled materials.  
These aspects are just to illustrate, and other examples could clearly have been men-
tioned. The main point we want to make here is that these new demand-driven changes 
serve as a trigger of new governance forms at the supply side. An example from the 
Norwegian potato processor Hoff Norske Potetindustrier is informative. Changes in 
consumer pattern trigger this company to regularly change the attributes of their prod-
ucts. These changes in attributes are not easily transmitted backwards throughout the 
value chain to producers. Standing alone, prices and other incentives are not sufficiently 
specific. More detailed specifications of the quality level are called for, in order to 
transmit the necessary signals of expected quality to the producers. For instance, all 
suppliers of potatoes intended to pommes frites must live up to detailed specifications as 
regards colour, size etc. This is an illustration of situations where the qualities of the end 
product to a large extent are determined by specific qualities of the raw product, e.g. 
organic food, animal welfare in production, functional food, etc., see for instance 
Boehlje (2002). Producers become more and more like tailors, in the sense that they 
must adapt to the detailed specifications of the end product.  
Differentiation in processing is not a new phenomenon, but the demand for qualities 
that originates at the farm level has increased the last decades (Bogetoft & Olesen, 
2004). These properties and qualities are not always easy to observe. For instance, it 
may be difficult to distinguish organically produced product from conventionally pro-
duced products. It is typically a situation where the information is asymmetrically dis-
tributed between buyer and seller. Subsequently, it will be necessary for the seller to 
transmit some quality signals or guarantees. This calls for quality signals in the form of 
branding (private control and enforcement), certification (third-party control and/or en-
forcement), or even public control. We also expect that production-management con-
tracts will, to an increasing extent, replace ³conventional´ sales contracts or spot mar-
kets. 
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New technology developments are spurring solutions that were unthinkable a few 
years ago. Some technological advances have a substantial influence on transaction 
costs. For instance, the food industries in many countries have developed an enormous 
capacity to track the flow of food along the supply chain. Some systems track the food 
back to the farm, while other track it only back to some key point in the production 
process (Golan et al., 2004). According to Golan et al., firms have three primary objec-
tives in developing, implementing and maintaining traceability systems; to improve 
supply management, to facilitate traceback for food safety and quality, and differentiate 
and market foods with subtle or undetectable quality attributes. Traceability is not the 
only means to these objectives, and alone it cannot accomplish any of them. For in-
stance, traceability systems do not create credence attributes, they simply verify their 
existence.  
Other technological changes are connected to logistics. New applications based on 
information technology make it easier to monitor sales and to order the ³right´ quanti-
ties at the ³right´ time. For some products this might reduce waste, thus reducing trans-
action costs, and also contribute to improved product quality. This technology lays the 
foundation for more demand-driven²and less supply-driven²value chains. 
Therefore, changes in technology may influence the level of transaction costs, and 
have a substantial impact on the possible scope of action. Such changes make it possible 
to meet new consumer demands at a ³reasonable´ cost. What was technologically im-
possible or too costly some years ago, is now possible and affordable. Thereby, changes 
in transaction costs might have an impact on governance structure. 
 
Through the last decades, the Norwegian agri-food sector has been increasingly influ-
enced by the dynamics at the international, institutional level (Veggeland, 2004). This is 
part of a broader globalisation. Here, we shall briefly pay attention to three important 
domains; i.e. food safety in general, GMO-based food, and organically produced food-
stuffs. In all three domains, international agencies are gradually developing international 
standards that are either binding or semi-binding for the involved nations. In most cases, 
these internationally developed standards constitute reference points for commercial 
actors who engage in economic transactions with the relevant foodstuffs. 
The agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) and the GATT/WTO agree-
ment mean that restrictions are imposed on national support for agriculture and on im-
port tariffs. In addition, there is a globalisation of standards and reduced technical barri-
ers to trade. The increasing globalisation of the agri-food sector implies that national 
producers to a greater extent face foreign competitors. National regulations are increas-
ingly harmonised. Accordingly, both producers and traders must take international stan-
dards into account, se more on this in Section 3.2.3.  
 
The food safety aspect has been increasingly pronounced in most western countries 
throughout the last decades. Not surprisingly, incidents of bovine spongiform encepha-
lopathy (BSE), E.coli, Salmonella and Listeria have heightened consumer concern over 
the safety of food supply. The food safety domain includes incidents of food-borne ill-
ness as well as assessment of the safety of specific food production and processing 
methods.  
The increased concern for food safety has motivated governments to introduce 
stricter food safety regulation. Public concern over outbreaks of food-borne diseases 
also prompted voluntary actions on the part of many industries. Quick identification and 
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isolation of the actor of the supply chain that is responsible for the outbreak is recog-
nized as critical by both industry and government (Hobbs and Young, 2001). Subse-
quently, many countries are working toward traceability of individual animals through 
the supply chain. Many industries are developing food safety standards and undertake 
the administration of those standards, which require close industry coordination. In ad-
dition, some manufacturers and retailers adopt hygiene and manufacturing standards 
that are more stringent than public standards. It is often costly to test for food safety, at 
least far more costly than to secure that production and distribution are made in a way 
that reduces the probability of food safety problems. However, as incomes increase, 
consumers are probably willing to pay more for higher food safety standards to mini-
mize risk (Hobbs & Young, 2001). In this respect, documentation of production pro-
cesses and of product quality is an important instrument. 
This situation might have an influence on new contractual arrangements between na-
tional actors at various stages of the value chain, but also between national and foreign 
actors in order to protect market shares and/or get into new markets. Increased con-
sumer worries about food safety greatly impact legislation and regulation within this 
area, both at national and international level. For instance, such worries are voiced 
through international standard setting agencies within human health (Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission), animal health (Office International des Epizooties, OIE) and plant 
health (International Plant Protection Convention, IPPC). The WTO agreement plays a 
particularly influential role. Norway¶s obligations as WTO member imply that all na-
tional measures and regulations at the food safety area must be in accordance with the 
SPS agreement and TBT agreement.13 There is now an increasing pressure to harmonize 
national food safety standards into regional standards (e.g. EU standards) as well as 
global standards (e.g. Codex).  
Food quality standards have a long tradition in Norway as well as in other countries. 
Norway has established ³Norsk Standard´, and other countries have similar systems. 
The standards specify some basic rules concerning products and services. It is often 
voluntary to follow standards in a strict legal sense. In other cases the law specifies that 
a certain standard has to be met, e.g. Norways obligations according to the EEA agree-
ment to adapt to EU standards. However, the great advantage of following standards is 
to reduce transaction costs, especially when the same standards apply to many coun-
tries, as mentioned above.  
 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) techniques refer to manipulation techniques 
that open the door for more tailor-made production of foodstuffs. So far, however, there 
is a widespread scepticism towards GMO food. The uncertainty associated with the 
product properties is high, and all necessary information cannot be conveyed through 
prices. Norwegians are among the most sceptical in Europe towards GMO food (Myk-
keltvedt, 2004). GMO-free food can be regarded as a credence good since information 
is asymmetrically distributed between buyers and sellers. Quality standards are neces-
sary supplements to price information. The international food authorities (particularly 
the Codex) play an important role in implementing the required standards.  
 
Organic farming illustrates a situation where a public certification system is used in 
order to clarify the operational definition of the involved quality attributes. Norway 
complies with the EU regulations regarding marketing of organic produce. In Norway, 
                                                 
 13 SPS agreement: Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, TBT agreement: 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
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the Debio quality certification system has been delegated the right to develop a legally 
binding definition of ³organic farming´ and to certify organic producers and processors. 
The actors in the food supply chain can and will rely on these systems, and possibly add 
some special contractual conditions regarding logistics etc. 
The regulations regarding organic farming and food safety might be regarded as a 
kind of standardisation although they are not formulated as ³Norsk standard´ or an in-
ternational standard. Standards and standardization have gained more attention during 
recent years. One reason is the SPS and TBT agreements as part of the GATT/WTO 
agreement which became effective in 1995 (Veggeland, 2004). Both the SPS and the 
TBT agreement refer to international standards as important measures to prevent techni-
cal barriers to trade.  
One hypothesis is that ³«new commodity standards created by a fall in the cost of 
measurement turn private information about commodities into a public good; shift self- 
enforced components of agreements into their contractual, state enforced components; 
lead to less vertical integration, increase the incidence of theft; make the contents of 
commodities clearer, more comparable and easier to enforce; and thus make competi-
tion more µperfect¶.´ (Barzel, 2003: 1). It is in accordance with this hypothesis that 
Gilde Norsk Kj¡tt no longer has contracts regarding organic meat. However, it is neces-
sary for the farmer to be Debio-certified and to inform the slaughterhouse that the ani-
mal for slaughter is produced organically. The animals must have Debio¶s organic ear-
mark. The farmer has to notify deliveries at least 2±3 weeks in advance, depending on 
kind of animal (cattle and lamb and to some extent pigs) (Wold, 2004).  
 
As discussed earlier, there is now a development towards deregulation of national food-
markets. We have witnessed a change in the agricultural policy from ³less market, more 
state´ to ³less state, more market´. The change is more pronounced in some sectors (e.g. 
the fruit and vegetables) than in other sectors. Regulation represents bonds for the ac-
tions and interaction of the players, and the market regulation mechanism take care of 
some tasks that could be expected to be contracted without public regulation, such as 
securing an outlet for the primary producers. Deregulation typically leaves more room 
for ³private´ agreements of various kinds (bilateral and/or multilateral).  
At the same time as the traditional market regulation is reduced, however, regulation 
regarding e.g. food safety is increasing in importance. The state also introduces new 
labelling schemes, e.g. labels of origin, regulations for production and marketing of or-
ganic food etc. The state alters its role and function; from direct regulation to a third 
party role in various ³guarantee-securing´ arrangements (quality standards, labelling). 
Such arrangements help to fill in information gaps in the sense that they guarantee a 
certain quality level in a situation when properties are hidden for consumers. Given the 
vocabulary suggested by Transaction Cost Economics, these are all special cases of au-
thority mechanisms (Hegrenes and Borgen, 2005).  
An increasing share of the consumers demands a more transparent production and 
distribution process. The establishment of quality certification systems such as KSL, 
Matmerk etc.14 can be interpreted as an institutional response to such demands. These 
certification systems imply that essential parts of a bilateral contract can be settled by 
simply prescribing that the parties respect the rules and standards of the body in ques-
tion. For instance, most wholesalers take for granted that their suppliers of agri-food 
products live up to the relevant KSL standards in order to qualify as supplier. In other 
                                                 
 14 KSL (Kvalitetssystem i landbruket) means Quality System in Agriculture. Matmerk is a 
labelling institution. 
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cases, these standards serve more as a point of reference to which all involved parties 
may refer. In either case, transaction costs are significantly reduced as compared to the 
situation where all contingencies are subject to detailed negotiations.  
 
When it comes to governance level²i.e. what Williamson (2000) refers to as the level 
of second order economizing²significant changes can easily be observed in the Nor-
wegian agri-food sector. To a large extent, they are linked to the new ³rules of the 
game´ that unfold at the international and/or national institutional level. But they are not 
fully determined by these new rules, since scope remains for other drivers too. Here, we 
shall briefly mention the most important factors.  
 
The Norwegian retail industry is among the most concentrated in Europe (Hughes, 
2002). The four large retailer chains have a market share of 99%. We have emphasised 
²among other factors²the significance of changed consumer patterns and more mar-
ket oriented political ideology. What are the consequences of this high concentration for 
the contractual arrangements in the sector?  
The first factor to take into account is increased vertical integration. For a long pe-
riod of time, the farmers were the main integrators. Farmers established sales coopera-
tives to sell and process their products. Possibilities for productivity gains and cost re-
ductions along with a wish to increase market power were important incentives.  
Lately, both horizontal and vertical integration have been increasing within the re-
tailer and the wholesaler sectors. The retailer sector is now dominated by four chains 
which are integrated with wholesalers.15 In large, the market power of the retail sector 
has increased, whereas the power of the processing industry and the farmers has dimin-
ished. Earlier the processors could be regarded as agents for the farmers, and the retail-
ers as agents for the processors. Now the retailers might be regarded as principals and 
the processors as agents, and the processors are agents vs. the farmers (Hornibrook & 
Fearne, 2002).  
This development is consistent with the process that Boehlje (1999) has referred to as 
³the new manufacturing philosophy´. So far, the expanding retailer groups have utilized 
the benefits of vertical and horizontal integration best. They have streamlined the value 
chains and reaped benefits. This represents a significant push towards more unilateral 
contracts. 
The retailers as a group are now in a very strong position when negotiating terms of 
trade. Retail chains introduce more and more private labels with specific quality re-
quirements. In order to guarantee a specific quality level, the owners of the brands have 
a need to control the whole production process. The retail sector does no longer ³take 
what they can get´, but instead decide what they will have (Busch, 2004). In the same 
spirit, Kinsey (2002) talks about ³The Big Shift from a Food Supply to a Food Demand 
Chain´. Such trends indicate a wish from the wholesalers and retailers to have more 
influence on how production is carried out.  
 Traceability is another part of food safety guaranties. From a contractual point of 
view, risk sharing and how to share responsibility are among the interesting issues.  
Furthermore, there seems to be a preference among consumers for both low prices 
and a variety of commodities to choose among. In Norway, discount-chains have a large 
                                                 
 15 The German retail chain Lidl opened its first shops in Norway in autumn 2004 and is a 
fifth chain.  
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market share. The vertical integration of the wholesaler and retailer sector might be in-
terpreted as part of a cost reducing strategy; to get control over the logistics and to re-
duce the number of transactions might be an efficient means to reduce transaction costs. 
This effect is additional to the effect of greater bargaining power.  
Discount concepts often imply a relatively narrow spectre of varieties with little 
room for specialty products. The ordinary marketing channels will be interested in spe-
cialty products only if the producers can ³guarantee´ high volume and sufficient profit. 
Concentration of retail chains might exclude some producers and products from the 
shelves, also some innovative products and products demanded by a relatively small 
group. Producers of specialty products and innovative products might have to develop 
alternative marketing channels (Jervell & Borgen, 2004). Farmers Market is one exam-
ple of such ³new´ marketing channels. 
The development within the Norwegian apple sector the last decades might illustrate 
some of the implications of these trends for the sales cooperatives. In the 1980s, the 
horticulture sales¶ cooperative (Gartnerhallen) benefited from a strong market position. 
Gartnerhallen did not find it necessary to build its own brands, but had significant mar-
ket power as compared to the other wholesalers. In the 1990s, Norway experienced the 
consolidation and concentration of the retail/wholesale sector. Gartnerhallen got fewer 
and larger customers. Finally, Gartnerhallen lost all delivery contracts. In order to save 
as much as possible of its assets, Gartnerhallen entered into a strategic alliance with 
BAMA/Norgesgruppen. The role as market regulator was partly taken over by other 
institutions, partly terminated. The producers ended with a significantly weaker market 
position.16  
 
As illustrated in this chapter, the Norwegian retail sector is in a period of rapid transi-
tion. Consumers are demanding lower prices and more varieties. They also demand 
more product information and quality guaranties. Producers and retail chains develop 
quality assurance systems. In some cases, public standard or regulations can be relied 
on, as in the case of organic farming and organic products. In trade politics, the nations 
partly rely on international standards, as in the case of SPS and TBT, to prevent undue 
protection. Internationally developed standards will more and more serve as reference 
points for commercial actors who engage in trading. Thereby, these standards will indi-
rectly constitute a significant part of the bilateral or multilateral contract(s) by which 
economic transactions are settled.  
The retail and wholesale sectors have become more integrated and concentrated. To a 
greater extent than before, the retail sector can now decide on their own premises what 
they want to sell. They do not have to sell what the farmers and the manufacturers want 
to sell. The control of the time and conditions of delivery, and the quality and appear-
ance attributes17 is to a larger part than before in the hands of the retail chains. The re-
tailer chains have increased their market power. 
The effects for contracting formats of the trends illustrated in this chapter must be 
view in the context of the changes discussed in Chapter 2. The retailer chains are in po-
sition to profit from these changes. This sector will have a strong influence on the con-
tractual developments that will develop if and when the border protection is reduced and 
the national agricultural policy is changed. 
                                                 
 16 The development in the apple sector in general and in the Hardanger region especially is 
described by Knutsen et al. (2001). 
 17 The terms ´control of the time and conditions of delivery, and the quality and appearance 
attributes´ are borrowed from Wilcox & Cochrane (1960, Chapter 9). 
 22 
 
 23
 
In this chapter we draw some general conclusions on what can be expected in the future. 
The topic is discussed in more details in Borgen & Hegrenes (2005).  
Profitability is regarded as an important goal, but not necessarily the only goal, for 
the actors in the agri-food sector. In a competitive situation cost-reduction is an impor-
tant strategy for firms in their struggle to improve profitability. Changes at the institu-
tional level will have an influence on what is feasible for the various actors. Some pos-
sible changes are briefly mentioned in the following. 
Import protection (high import tariffs) is an important part of Norwegian agricultural 
policy. Less protection, for instance through a new WTO agreement, might become of 
great importance for Norwegian agriculture, the processing industry, the re-
tail/wholesale sectors, and the consumers. At present it is impossible to gauge the out-
come of the negotiations with certainty. However, based on the framework agreement 
from 2004 (WTO, 2004), one can expect reduction in export subsidies and import tar-
iffs, and increased market access. In addition, reductions in trade-distorting national 
support (³amber box´ and ³blue box´ support) can be expected. However, much re-
mains to be negotiated about, and the outcome is uncertain.  
The differences between the target prices and the reference prices are important ele-
ment when estimating ³amber box´ support. If Norway has to reduce the ³amber´ box 
support as a result of the WTO negotiations, one alternative measure is to dispose of the 
target price system for some or all products. We expect that the rest of the market regu-
lation system could be continued. To dispose of target prices would change the market 
regulation schemes quite substantially, and could potentially increase the frequency of 
contracting.  
Globalisation of food trade (lower tariffs etc.) changes the relation between Norwe-
gian producers, processors, and retailers. The producers and processors will face 
tougher competition from foreign producers. If the retailers (the retail chains) are not 
satisfied with the conditions offered by Norwegian producers, the retailers can more 
easily trade with foreign producers if the import tariffs are lower. The producers might 
react to tougher competition from foreign producers by more extensive use of country 
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of origin labels and other labels. If the consumers are willing to pay a higher price for 
Norwegian products, this strategy might be successful. Such a strategy will have conse-
quences for the contractual formats of the sector. 
Although the implementation of the new WTO agreement will be some years from 
now, WTO will more and more influence Norwegian agriculture. In the meantime the 
public market regulation schemes will be important for most products in Norwegian 
agriculture (milk, meat, eggs, cereals and some other products). Agricultural coopera-
tives will still be important in implementing the policy. We do not expect contracts, in 
addition to membership in cooperatives, to become very frequent or very extensive for 
the main products from Norwegian agriculture in the near future. 
Some trends that are relatively independent of the development within WTO can also 
be expected to be of great interest for contractual arrangements. Some of these trends 
have been explored in some detail in case studies in this project or in other projects. We 
briefly mention some of the conclusions: 
 Contractual arrangement will be developed for products where the public market 
regulation schemes are terminated or become less important. The retailer/wholesaler 
chains have the power to ³decide´ the terms of the contract. An important question is 
to what extent they will exercise the power (Knutsen et al., 2001; Borgen & Hegre-
nes, 2005). 
 Consumer concerns for food quality and food safety create a need for more extensive 
traceability systems and quality assurance systems. This can be expected to increase 
the use of production contracts. 
 The quest for profitability and the competitive situation call for efficient logistics. 
Contracts can be expected in order to simplify logistic an d to reduce transaction 
costs. 
 ³New´ marketing channels will develop for products that are not marketed through 
the integrated supply chains. Farmers¶ markets and other forms of direct marketing 
are examples of such new marketing channels (Jervell & Borgen, 2004; Svennerud & 
Jervell, 2004; Svennerud, Jervell & yen, 2004). 
 Farmers¶ marketing and processing cooperatives will develop contracts to handle 
specialty products where the demanded quality originates at farm level (S¡rensen, 
2005). 
 Public standards and control schemes for organic farming and marketing of organic 
products will serve as reference points for bilateral contracts. This implies that proc-
essors need not necessarily have to enter detailed production management contracts 
(Borgen & Hegrenes, 2005), but their obligations will probably be just as demanding.  
 
In conclusion, we expect government regulations of Norwegian agriculture to be impor-
tant for many years to come. But the agri-food sector will become more consumer- 
driven than it has been until now. Sales and production contracts will become more 
common in Norwegian agriculture in the future. Contracts will be more common for 
value-added products than for ³bulk´ products. Such contracts will develop also within 
some of the agricultural cooperatives.  
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